




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Climate justice

- 1) Is a particularly important and emerging area within EJ
- 2) Links together many superficially disparate strains within the environmental and EJ movements, inc. mobilizations around
 - a) industrial toxics and toxic dumping
 - b) air and water pollution
 - c) energy extraction
 - d) pipeline safety
 - e) land use
 - f) indigenous//First Nations/Aboriginal rights.
- 3) Has been a key focus of youth-oriented orgs ie PowerShift.

However~

- 4) Is also one of the areas of EJ that is most apparently distant and spatially removed from people's everyday lives
- 5) Challenges activists, advocates, and academics to demonstrate the way that local problems reflect larger global injustices




















What can be done (directly) to translate public sentiment > political outcomes?

Suggestions from what we know about HR campaigns:

- Ambiguity of laws hampers effectiveness (Wong 2010)
- Nature of violation (Keck and Sikkink 1998); presence of three attributes increases effectiveness of campaigns
 - Bodily harm
 - Clear line of responsibility
 - Blocking victims' legal opportunity
- Tactics (Roth)
 - Focussing on individual sufferings and injustices increases effectivness
- States generally violate because the benefits outweigh the costs
- Problems of defining each of elements of nature of violation

How might we expect CJ campaigns to be different?

- Many EJ campaigns highly localised; therefore cannot resort to the shaming "boomerang" described by Keck and Sikkink that may be effective in other HR campaigns
- 2) CJ campaigns specifically, if climate discourse becomes sufficiently prominent, may have a hard time convincing public or key stakeholders of their importance
 - 1) Too distant spatially
 - 2) Perceived to be too remote temporally
 - 3) Definitely hard to personalise
- 3) Ambiguity of laws is particularly severe in CJ cases
 - 1) EJ laws generally only date back =< 40 years
 - 2) Laws impacting CJ, such as those re: climate mitigation & adaptation are still in development, internationally and domestically
 - 3) May in some cases not be recognised as such
- In future this project will compare CJ campaigns with other EJ campaigns, & within state comparisons to control for regime type

Hypotheses:

- H1: CJ campaigns that have an international audience have greater chances of success* (through boomerang effect)
- H2: CJ campaigns that focus on personal cases and stories have a greater chance of success
- H3: CJ campaigns that include clear violations of (domestic) law have a greater chance of success
- H4: CJ campaigns that clearly and <u>convincingly</u> identify responsible parties have a greater chance of success (note there are two elements to this)
- H5: CJ campaigns where there is little cost to government for redress/ceasing violations have a greater chance of success (this requires consideration of indirect costs)
- 1) Question: Who is chosen as alternative boomerang target?
- Possibility: include costs to corporate interests (directly, rather than assuming they affect government actors)
- In future this project will compare CJ campaigns with other EJ campaigns, & within state comparisons to control for regime type, level of democracy/transparency and legal structures

^{*}and will have greater gains

Some preliminary empirical tests using the EJAtlas Mapping Project

The **EJAtlas** maps.....

"Environmental Justice or Ecological Distribution conflicts — conflicts that highlight the distributive & structural impacts of economic activities on the health and environment of specific populations."

Effects are economic, health related, socio-cultural or environmental.

Most cases include communities mobilizing against negative perceived effects of environmental injustices

Ecological conflicts= "struggles over the burdens of pollution or over the sacrifices made to extract resources, [which] arise from inequalities of income and power. Sometimes the local actors claim redistributions, leading to conflicts, which are often part of, or lead to larger gender, class, caste and ethnic struggles....EJ not only refers to the distribution of costs &benefits but ... also ...participation &recognition claims" (EJOLT Maps 2015).






Testing H1: Campaigns with International Audiences Are More Likely to Succeed

Bivariate Correlation=.011 T-test: Outcomes Without, and With National and International NGO Involvement

	Without NGOs	With NGOs
Mean	0.956522	0.866667
Variance	0.86166	0.695238
Observations	23	15
Pooled		
Variance	0.79694	
Hypothesized		
Mean		
Difference	0	
df	36	
t Stat	0.303283	
P(T<=t)	0.38171	



H3: CJ campaigns that include clear violations of (domestic) law have a greater chance of success

Correlation = 0.20

t-Test: Campaigns that did not, and did, employ the legal system

Without Action Through the Courts

Mean 0.77 1.15

Variance 0.653594771 0.871052632

Observations 18 20

Pooled Variance 0.768364198

Hypothesized Mean Difference 0

df 36

t Stat -1.30700783

P(T<=t) one-tail 0.099748716

H4: CJ campaigns that clearly and <u>convincingly</u> identify responsible parties have a greater chance of success (two elements)

- This will require content analysis
- Simple and imperfect proxy for convincing = visible effects; database allows this to be further disaggregated
- Correlation coefficient = .080

	t-Test			THE RESERVE
No. of the State o		Without visible	With visible	
150		health impacts	health impacts	
	Mean	0.818182	0.9625	The state of the s
1	Variance	0.822511	0.8625	200
	Observations	22	16	
	Pooled Variance	0.839173		
1 4 -	Hypothesized			Market State
	Mean Difference	0		
The second second	df	36		N. W.
	t Stat	-0.81173		
	$P(T \le t)$	0.211142		

